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SARTREAN LOGIC AND
THE GOD-PROJECT
10e key to Sartre's conception of the God-project is to be found in his
ontology, and specifically in his reaction to traditional Aristotelian-Thomistic
logic, wh'icb be ultimately overtums. In keepmg with this logic, a pair of
contradictory terms cannot jointly be true or false. 1Ous, if being is posited as
a universal, non-being must of necessity be an error. Altbough certain ancients,
including Heraclitus and the negative theologians, implicitly cballenged this
logic, it was not uotil the nineteenth century that philosopbers began to
systematize the structures of ontological contradiction. Por Hegel, contradiction
was the moving principle of the world, and as a result, being was not static but
in a process of becoming. Sartre also envisions a being-in-becoming. In contrast
to Hegel, bowever, be maintains that the synthesis of being and nothingness
always short-eircuits.
According to Sartrean ontology, though being and nothingness are logical
contradictories, botb are true modes of being. Sartre chooses to posit them as
contradictories ratber tban contraries because contraries need not jointly exhaust
a universe of discourse. Contraries are thus inadequate to the task of elucidating
a fundamental ontotogy. Moreover, while a contrary is an external negation of
a universal, a contradictory is an internat negation, which Sartre identifies with
the notbingness of consciousness itsetf.
The following square of ontological opposition will help clarify Sartrean
logic.
A. all being is
I. some being is
E. no being is
O. some being is not
In this scheme, the proposition "A" refers to the being of the In-itself and
the proposition "0" to the being of the For-itself. Logically speaking, the "A"
precedes and is the condition of the "0" insofar as the latter is a negation of the
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former. It should he noted, however, that while the "A" takes logical precedence
over the "0," the "0," as the Iived-experience of consciousness, has an
existential priority over the "A. " For this reason it is possible to speak of Sartre
as an "existential logician. "
Whereas in the Aristotelian-Thomistic system, the "E" and the "0" are
both false, in the Sartrean system, the "E" is false but the "0" is true. The
internal negation of the For-itself ("0") is simultaneously an affirmation of the
In-itself ("A") as world. The "I" is subsequently affinned when the For-itself
passes from a pre-reflective consciousness of being to a reflective consciousness
of "this" or "that." In contrast to the "A," the "I" results from an external
negation through which "some being" is distinguished from the being that it is
not. As with the "0," the "A" is logically prior to the "I." This is precisely
what Sartre calls tbe "transphenomenality of heing. "
The relationship that Sartre establisbes between the "A" and tbe "I"
confirms tbe Aristotelian-Thomistic principle that while the subaltemate
particular is implied by the universal, the universal cannot perforce be derived
from the subaltern. Thus, tbough consciousness experiences an apodictic
certainty of its own non-heing, the existence of universal nothingness ("E")
cannot logically be derived from consciousness. Were it possible to do so, then
heing would vanish and the entire logical edifice would collapse. Surprisingly
enough, this is precisely what occurs in certain religious systems, such as that
of the mystics.
Notwithstanding, the "E" can, in keeping with the Sartrean system, exist
as an imaginary being. It is posited by tbe "0" not through an intemal but an
extemal negation of tbe "A." In contrast to the extemal negation which gives
eise to the "I," this particular negation does not negate one being with reference
to another ("this" as opposed to "that"); rather, it negates "all being" with
reference to itself. This operation, insofar as itjuxtaposes nothing with nothing,
is nullified, and in reality heing remains intact. Nevertheless, through an act of
bad faith, consciousness denies tbe failure of its negation, and from tbe
quasi-nothingness of the world it attempts to endow itself with the being that it
lacks. In this context, the "E" might be called the imaginary In-itself of
consciousness. It might also, in certain circumstances, be described as the
"substance" of God.
The atheism of Sartre is fOfDlulated in terms of this basic logical system.
Were the divinity to exist in reality, it would be tbe synthesis of the propositions
"A" and "0," that is, of being and nothingness. Such a synthesis "haunts"
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pre-retlective con~iousness as the totality that it forever strives to become. A
pseudo-being, it is not an object of pre-reflective consciousness but rather its
ultimate possibility. WCet etre, WSartre states, Wsurgit en meme temps qutelle [la
conscience], a la fois dans son coeur et hors dteile, il est la transcendance
absolue dans Itimmanence absolue, iI nty a priorit6 ni de lui sur la conscience
ni de la conscience sur lui: ils/ont couplew (Etre 134). This statement is crucial
to an understanding of much religious ontology. It contains, in secular terms,
the key to the paradox of a God who is absolutely transcendent and yet who is
experienced at the heart of human interiority.
The Sartrean dyad of the human and tbe divine is not the For-itselfand the
In-Itself ~ut instead the For-itself and witself" as the synthesis of the For-itself
and the In-itself. This synthesis, however, is unrealizable to the extent that the
For-itself, despite its negations, is unable to appropriate the being of the
In-itself. Its In-itself, as the contrary of heing, remains imaginary, as does the
God that it uItirnately bopes to become.
Nonetheless, one might justifiably wonder why the synthesis of heing and
nothingness is impossible. Sartre, to be sure, arguesthat the In-itself and the
For-itself are contradictory terms. Yet in contrast to Aristotelian-Thomistic
ontology, they are both true dimensions of being. Were it not for the presence
of a certain footnote in L 'EIre et le neant, we might be tempted to use the
anti-scholastic logic of Sartre to undertake an articulation of the synthesis of
heing and nothingness that he insists is impossible. The note, however, which
merits citing in its entirety, clarifies the problem:
On sera tente peut-atre de traduire la trinite enviaagee en tenne. hegeliens et de faire
de I'en-soi la th~se, du pour-lOi I'antith~se et de l'en-lOi-pour-soi ou Valeur la
synthese. Mais iI raut observer iei que, si le Pour-soi manque de l'En-soi, l'En-soi
ne manque pas du Pour-soi. 11 n'y a done pa. r6eiprocite dan. I'opposition. En un
mot, le Pour-soi demeure inessentiel et eontingentpar rapport ~ l'En-BOi et e'est eette
inessentialite que nous appelions plus haut se faetieite. En outre, la synth~se ou
Valeur serait bien un retour ~ la th~se, done un retour sur BOi, mai. eomme elle est
totalite irrealisable, le Pour-soi n'est pa. un moment qui puisse etre depass6. Comme
tel, sa nature le rapproche beaueoup plus des realities 'ambigue.' de Kierkegaard. En
outre, nous trouvons iei un double jeu d'oppositions unilaterale.: le Pour-80i, en un
sens, manque de l'En-soi, qui ne manque pa. de lui; mais en un autre, iI manque de
IOn possible (ou Pour-soi manquant) qui ne manque pa. non plu. de lui. (138).
A synthesis ofbeing and nothingness is therefore impossible because ofthe
radical aIterity of the two terms. Clearly, the In-itself does not affect the
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For-itself, either internally or extemally.TheFor-itself.ontheotherhand.as
the internal negation of the In-itself, makes a world appear on the ground of
heing. Yet this world is precisely an appearancethat disappears with the
For-itself. Tbus, though the For-itself ia ontologically bound to the In-itself, its
action is unable to affect the In-itself in its being. It is in this eontext that Sartre
states: -La negation ne saurait atteindre le noyau d'etre de Petre qui est
plenitude absolue et entiere positivit6" (EIre SO). The only effect that the
For-itself produees is an appearance wbieb ultimately vanishes with its death.
This state of affairs bas led certain erities to conelude that the ontology of
Sartre is a dualism. He bimself would maintain that bis system is monistie,
specifically because the For-itself ia adependent being that is "born, " according
to the ontological proof, ·portee sur UD atre qui n'est pas elle" (EIre 28).
Non-heing does not issue from beina, wbieb is full positivity, nor is its "birth"
the synthesis of a previous dialectical opposition. Rather, it is an unparalleled
occurrence, similar in its unieity (although ontologically the reverse) to the
divine ereation ex nihilo. For Sartre, however, the question of the "whenee" of
nothingness is a moot one that metaphysieians and others have attempted to
address but that he, as a phenomenologist, ehooses to let drop.
Sartrean ontology, it might be said, is a monism of both being and
nothingness. Were it not monistie, then it would ultimately disintegrate into the
idealistie ontology intuited by the mystics and exponents of negative theology.
In Sartre, nothingness is inextricably intertwined with being, but it can never
transcend its mode of non-being. In the negative theologians, on the other hand,
nothingness ean be disengaged from being. Sueh a disengagement for Sartre
would be the eonsequenee ofan aet of derealization through whieh consciousness
atternpts to hypostatize its nothingness and endow itself with the being that it
lacks. This derealization would he a flight from the original intuition of freedom
and an aet of profound bad faith. In strietly ontologieal terms, therefore, Sartre's
atheism can be viewed as a refusal to grant nothingness a status of being
independent of the In-itself.
Sartre rejects God not only in general philosophieal terms but also in the
eontext of the Christian Trinity. Aeeording to the Hegelian eoneeption of the
Trinity, indicated by Sartre in the aforementioned footnote from L 'Etre et le
neanl, the Father and Son, as thesis and antithesis, would be integrated into a
synthesis whieh is the Holy Spirit. In analyzing this triad, John MeTaggart Ellis
MeTaggart adds the following erueial point: "In so far as they (the Father and
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the Son] are laken to be correlative with the Holy Ghost, as on the same level
with the latter, the Father and the Son are simply abstractions which the thinker
makes from the concrete reality of the Holy Ghost" (204). Thus, because "the
result of the dialectic is never a triad but a 'single truth'" (Thatcher 93), the
Hegelian God is not triune but, in fact, the Holy Spirit itself.
Were the Persons of the Trinity applied to the Sartrean God, then the
In-itself, as thesis, would be God the Father, and the For-itself, as antithesis,
would be God the Sone The Holy Spirit, on the other hand, would be the
synthesis of these two heings-the divine monad that haunts consciousness f~om
the moment of its original upsurge. In order to achieve tbis synthesis,
consciousness, as a Christ figure, is prepared to sacrifice its own ontological
status in the world. Through the selfsame reversal that appears in much mystical
theology, it simultaneously negatesthe world as heing and itself as non-heing.
The goal is to endow the In-itself with the fluidity of the For-itself and the
For-itself with the density of the In-itself. Because of the alterity of the terms,
however, the In-itself-For-itself remains imaginary, and hence the ever
unrealizable ideal of all human endeavor. It is in this context that Sartre
concludes L 'EIre elle neanl: "Ainsi la passion de I'homme est-elle inverse de
celle du Christ, car I'homme se perd en tant qu 'homme pour que Dieu naisse.
Mais I' id6e de Dieu' est contradictoire et nous nous perdons en vain; I'homme
est une passion inutile" (708).
Sartre, however, describes the Holy Spirit not only as the impossible
In-itself but as the other. In the famous passage of Les MOlS, where he reveals
his inability as a child to believe in God the Father, he states: "Mais I'Autre
restait, I'Invisible, le Saint-Esprit" (210). This Holy Spirit, as Sartre would
clarify, is what survived of God in the secular culture of late nineteenth- and
early twentieth-eentury Europe. It was not so much a Person, in the theological
sense, as the absolute ideal through which consciousness articulated its existence.
Notwithstanding, the Sartrean Holy Spirit is also a projection of the human
other. In an effort to grasp the "Us-object," that is, the whole of human
subjectivity as an objective being in the world, consciousness posits an
"etre-regardant qui ne peutjamais etre regard6" (EIre 495). Such a being would
be capable of constituting humanity in its totality. Yet like the In-itself-For-itself,
it remains a Iimiting-eoncepl. Even if it existed, it would unite human beings
extemallyinarelationshipofalterity.Ultimately.this means that there is no
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ontological union with the other. Just as consciousness is alienated from being,
so too is it alienated from all other consciousnesses.
The logic of this social alienation is to be found in the theory of
being-for-others propounded in L 'EIre et le neanl and refmed in the Cr;l;que.
According to Sartre, the other is revealed to consciousness through an alienating
look which objectifies it and reduces it to the status of a thing. Though
consciousness aspires to the In-itself of things, it does so not in the hope of
becoming a thing itself but of achieving the ideal synthesis of the
In-itself-For-itself. In order to overcome the threat posed by the other, therefore,
consciousness initiates a similar project of reification. It is for this reason that
Sartre fOrDlulated the now classic dictum that the essence of human relations is
not a'"M;Ise;n but a conflict.
Because consciousness can experience itself as a thing in the presence of
the other, it is apodictically certain that the other exists as a For-itself. It could
be argued, however, that the other is not DOwn interiorly by consciousness but
is rather the logical consequence of its own exteriority under tbe look. Were
consciousness to interiorize the subjectivity of the other, then it might, in
keeping witb the Sartrean system, identify the ontological project of tbe otber,
and all that this project entails in the world, as its OWD. In the Cr;l;que, Sartre
does allow for such a reciprocity of buman action in the moment of revolution,
when individuals attempt to transcend their mutual alienation. Yet he does not
recognize it in the personal relationships of parents and children, lovers. and
friends. For all intents and purposes, then. any concrete human bonding remains
absent from his thought.
Nevertheless, a Milse;n is recognized not only by various existentialists but
by numerous religious exponents who project it. Iike the Iimiting-eoncept ofthe
Sartrean "Us-object, " to the infinite. The Churcb, for example, as the mystical
body of Christ, or the Mass, as the communion of the faithful, is a Milse;n that
is taken to be God. A Mils~;n, moreover, is tbe foundation of Christian ethics
as expressed in the seven corporal works of mercy ("For I was an hungred, and
ye gave me meat" Matt. 25:25). It might even be said that the Holy Spirit is a
Milsein to the extent that it is believed to manifest itself among those who meet
in Christ's name.
Whereas the absolute other described by Sartre is a projection of tbe real
other, the Milse;n of the religious would be an extrapolation of an imaginary
other. Following Sartrean logic, tbis imaginary other would be posited by
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consciousness in an attempt either to appease the real other or to establish with
certain others a complicity in the context of group or class exploitation. For
Sartre this complicity would account for the myth of "brotherly love" in what
are fundamentally unethical societies.
Althougb Sartre defines God as an impossibility, be does not posit an a
prior; atheism since, like belief, atheism is in the fmal analysis a choice of
consciousness. Indeed, atheists are those who have "chosen" once and for all
that God does not exist. Wbile they are in "good faith,· believers are in "bad
faith" to the extent that their choice is founded on adesire to escape the anguish
of freedom. (Agnostics, it might be said, are in bad faith insofar as they choose
not to choose.) Through religion, Sartre concludes, humans ultimately attempt
to create the apparatus for transforming their own nothingness into the totality
of being. The effort, as he insists, is nevertheless doomed to failure.
Thetheological upshot of Sartrean ontology is that God cannot be made
to exist by human fiat. Wbat for centuries humans have thought to have leamed,
either through reason or faith, about a transcendent divinity, is in fact the truth
of their own reality. It might be said that for Sartre human beings are God, not
in a supematural sense, but precisely to the extent that everything regarding the
being of God is a corollary of human action.
While the philosophical atheism of Sartre is undeniable, the question of
personal beliefis more problematical. Sartre was aware ofthis beliefthat "dares
not speak its name," and discussed it on various occasions. At the end of Les
MOlS, after recalling the heroes of his childhood literature, he writes: "Je ne
rel~ve que d'eux qui ne rel~vent que de Dieu et je ne crois pas en Dieu. Allez
vous y reconnaitre. Pour ma part, je ne m'y reconnais pas et je me demande
parfois si je ne joue pas A qui perd gagne et ne m'applique A pi~tiner mes
espoirs d'autrefois pour que tout me soit rendu au centuple. En ce cas je serais
Philoctete: magnifique et puant, cet infinne a donn6 jusqu'A son arc, sans
condition: mais, souterrainement, on peut ~tre sOr qu'il attend SB r6compense"
(213). In the game of loser wins, Sartre could be seen as the most extreme sort
of negative theologian. Not only does he deny the existence of God, as do such
believers as Tillich, but he is even indifferent to the matter. This indifference,
however, was achieved only after a Iifetime of hold reflection. It is in factthe
final triumph over the spirit of seriousness. Wbether winner or loser, Sartre
chooses to view his life in the context of agame. It is his freedom that allows
hirn to do so. It is freedom, moreover, that is ultimately vindicated. He thus
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coDcludes the aforementioned statement with the following words: "Laissons
cela" (213).
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